US Warship Downs Houthi Drone Over Red Sea “In Self-Defense”

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has announced yet another intercept of a launch out of Yemen which had targeted commercial vessels in the Red Sea. 

CENTCOM described that the Saturday incident saw the USS Laboon guided-missile destroyer down a drone over the Red Sea, after it came near near several commercial ships in international waters.

USS Laboon in a prior live-fire exercise, via Flickr/US Navy

There were no casualties or damage to ships from the “unmanned aerial vehicle launched from Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen,” according to the US statement.

Further, the military statement suggests that US warships may have been targeted by the drone, given it says the USS Laboon shot the inbound drone down “in self-defense”.

The Biden administration has previously been accused of downplaying that there’s actually been attempted Houthi attacks directly on American warships and naval assets. This would of course be an act of war, and the White House is said to be belatedly drawing up plans to hit back at Houthi launch positions, in an offensive manner (and not just defensive intercepts).

This hasn’t happened yet, as the US is apparently pursuing a policy of restraint, not wanting a bigger regional war to break out with Iran, which has long backed the Houthis.

But the contradiction is that Washington has done nothing to impose any kind of limits or conditions on Gaza’s air campaign, which has resulted in unprecedented Palestinian civilian deaths.

Meanwhile the Pentagon has issued a lot of ‘final warnings’ as Red Sea attacks have persisted weekly & now daily…

The United States gave the Houthis a “final warning” in the Red Sea, and they responded with a sea drone to attack more ships. https://t.co/E0R25hT0qw

— FORTUNE (@FortuneMagazine) January 6, 2024

The Houthis say their ‘war on Red Sea shipping’ and on Israel itself will continue so long as Israel drops bombs on Gaza civilians. Meanwhile things have only escalated across the region, including Iran-backed militant attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria. 

These attacks across Iraq-Syria have led to an escalation in the Pentagon response, which most recently saw a very high-ranking and influential Iraqi militia leader killed. This has enraged the Iraqi government in Baghdad, given the commander, identified as Mushtaq Taleb al-Saidi, had been integrated with national forces, and was considered a key ally.

Below is a policy note exploring the implications of the growing tit-for-tat in the region, via Peter Tchir’s Academy Securities.

* * *

What has Happened:

Yesterday [Jan.11], a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad killed Mushtaq Taleb al-Saidi, who was deputy head of operations for the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF), a network of Iran-backed militia groups.
Since the war between Israel and Hamas began on October 7th, there have been over 100 attacks on U.S. and allied forces in Iraq and Syria by Iran-backed militia forces.
Iraq’s prime minister, who had the backing of Iran-aligned factions and militias when elected, called the attack “unjustified” and a “dangerous escalation and a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty.”
On Tuesday, as reported in our previous SITREP, a suspected Israeli drone attack killed Saleh al-Arouri (Hamas deputy leader) in Beirut.
In addition, an Israeli strike on Wednesday night killed a Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon and Israel has warned of more significant military action if a diplomatic deal is not reached to pull Hezbollah forces away from the Lebanese border.
Finally, the U.S., the UK, and other key allies issued “a final warning” to the Houthi rebels this week to cease its attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea or face consequences.

Why it Matters:

“First, it’s important to understand that deterrence is the product of three factors: capability, will, and the adversary’s perception of those capabilities and that will. If the first two factors are missing—or inordinately low—or the adversary doesn’t believe that the U.S. has the will to use their capabilities, then deterrence fails. This is the current situation. The proof is in the actions that commercial shipping companies have taken in halting their transit of the Red Sea. We have warships in the region—capability—but if we’re not going to use them to ensure free movement through the Red Sea—will—and the adversary believes that we won’t use them—perception—then we won’t be successful in deterring further aggression on the part of the Houthis and Iran. A strong response to the initial Iranian-backed Houthi attacks could have prevented this situation (i.e., strikes against the Houthi command & control apparatus, launch, storage, and maintenance sites). The solution is that we should stop just shooting down arrows and kill the archers. But the Biden administration has been hesitant to address the source of these attacks over concerns of escalation. Which raises a second point—escalation has already occurred—it was initiated by the Iranians, Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Iranian proxy groups.” – General David Deptula

“General Deptula lays it out nicely. Only comment I’d add is that the U.S. must produce a full array of attack options (both arrows and archers) that will punish Iranian proxies where they currently enjoy sanctuary. That is not an expansion of the current state of affairs; it is appropriate and would meet every legal prescription of proportionality. Not surprisingly, Iran is overreaching. The Iranian leadership, specifically the IRGC leadership, must know with certainty that their only sanctuary is within the borders of Iran.” – General Spider Marks

“General Deptula’s deterrence formula is how a great power imposes its will on a lesser power through military means. The current U.S. approach is not working, considering the continued attacks on U.S. forces in the region and the disruption of commerce through the Red Sea. The U.S. is failing to deter Iran and its proxy forces, and its deterrence strategy must be reset. The U.S. foreign policy is allowing bad actors to challenge the international order. The U.S. needs to escalate its response in compliance with international law to de-escalate the situation. How quickly and with how much force must be calibrated per General Marks’ salient points of proportionality and self-defense.” – General Robert Walsh

“While there is always the risk of a miscalculation that leads to escalation, I think that these recent events, while linked to multiple ongoing conflicts (many that predate 7 October), are not necessarily indicative of irreversible momentum toward broader escalation. Each participant (Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Houthis, or the U.S.) can adjust the rheostat as desired. These events could continue to play out as transactional, but limited in scope and scale, and are not indicative that a broader conflict is imminent or inevitable. I would not look at these as fully coordinated events, but rather as transactional. I’m not surprised to see ISIS claim the attacks in Iran which do not follow suit with how Mossad would traditionally strike in Iran proper. While it may seem counterintuitive given the strikes in Gaza, the Israeli government has been relatively surgical in their actions with respect to Iran to minimize casualties/collateral damage.

A possibly unanticipated outcome is that we may see a policy shift in Iraq. A deliberate strike in Baghdad has drawn the ire of the current regime (not that they haven’t complained during previous strikes) and may be enough for Iraq to consider a reduction (if not an elimination) of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Lately, there is more being written in the news and opinion pieces about the risk to U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq and questioning the mission. Another factor is whether the U.S. is willing to begin to strike Houthi infrastructure should maritime attacks continue. All that said, I would assess with moderate confidence that none of the nation states are looking to expand the conflict into a direct war and will continue to measure their responses. Where the U.S. is struggling is how to establish deterrence.” – General Robert Ashley

“The U.S. desires to de-escalate, not escalate, but the challenge is that the same military response can be used to achieve both results. There are plenty of historical examples of U.S. administrations aggressively addressing such threats, resulting in Iran (and others) choosing to back down due to the sudden and high costs that they have incurred. Aggressive action (sinking ships, shooting down aircraft, and killing forces attacking civilian targets) may be our best chance to de-escalate Iran’s actions. It is doubtful that Iran will back down without a serious punch in the nose.” – General Mastin Robeson

“The bottom line is that escalation will occur by proxies if we don’t change our response and reset our deterrence level. We don’t have the initiative and many allies are not joining our efforts to deter Houthi strikes against shipping. They also see that our policy and posture are not working. The strike in Baghdad is a response that may have unintended consequences. It is possible that the Iraqis can expel or reduce U.S. forces in Iraq which could have a major impact on counterterrorism operations ongoing in Iraq and Syria. If we want an effective deterrent at this point, we will need to increase our response to attacks at a 1-1 level.” – General Frank Kearney

Please see (link) and attached PDF for full report.